South Africa election 24 – reflecting on thirty years of state making & state breaking

I – Back to the basics of statehood 

With the much anticipated 2024 elections looming, and having recently crossed over the thirty years of democracy line, we decided to go back to the fundamentals of statehood, the characteristics of sovereignty, and how we think state making in South Africa is faring, thirty years since project democracy launched in all earnest. 

It could be argued that for a democracy to function optimally, certain enabling conditions are needed. While there can be much debate about what to include, as critical supporting conditions for a democratic system, we propose that a stable, capacitated, and efficient state system is one of the most important enabling factors.

II – Why the state exists?

The state is, as in classic political thinking, the only institution (within its geographical boundaries) that may wield and control the means of violence. Derived from the work of Thomas Hobbes, the State, or Leviathan, is an intervention in a world where, if there is no unified, or centralised ‘order’ that can provide a measure of internal collective security for citizens (thus protection against violence humans unleash on each other), humans end up living in a perpetual state of war. 

The words Thomas Hobbes uses to describe human life, in absence of a centralised state, are: poor, nasty, brutish, and short. People are accordingly ‘rescued’ from the ‘state of nature, or, war of all against all,’ condition, by the creation of a state, which through its monopoly on the means of violence, should at least guarantee internal/civic peace.

The main reason Hobbes proposed the idea of creating an institution that concentrates and centralises the means of violence, is to provide and establish a ‘guarantor’ of civic peace, and maintenance of an agreed social contract. While this may be a somewhat oversimplified rendition of the purpose of the state, it is argued that the question of the states’ ability to provide a foundation of civic peace, extends beyond physical security, into the domain of broader human security. 

III – The South African state post-1994

If the South African experience of thirty years of democracy is analysed in the context of the capability of the state, several red and yellow flags can be raised. If the state does not, or cannot, provide collective security to its citizens, economy, and infrastructure (eg. railway systems), for example, it can be argued that it is not delivering on its part of the social contract. 

Numerous diverse examples can be isolated, in the South African context, that illustrate ways in which the post-1994 state has failed to deliver on its part of the social contract bargain between citizenry- and state. These include rolling electricity blackouts, broken rail systems, vandalism and theft of critical infrastructure, potholed roads, waterless cities and communities, decaying road infrastructure. The proverbial horrors of the South African national, provincial, and especially local government reality lived (or rather, endured) by citizens, may not always be seen, or interpreted in the context of the states’ duty to provide collective security, however, these play a critical role in maintaining stability in society, and the economy. 

Once the state fails to provide services, and exposes citizenry to the cancerous impact and consequences of corruption, criminality and looting on the streets (as in July 2021) the state actually becomes a source of violence (not for the good of the collective). The violence of the state then manifests through state weaknesses, and systemic failures (e.g. what is too often euphemistically called ‘lacking and failing service delivery’) that inflict its own form of systemic violence on citizens, the economy, and society. 

IV – What enabling factors are needed for a democracy to flourish?

Cycling back to our opening statement. We argue that one of the factors that enables a democratic system to function optimally is the capacity of the state to deliver on its part of the social contract bargain. Once a state system, such as that of South Africa is compromised through maladministration, corruption, and state capture, the conditions for a strong well functioning democracy are also compromised. The fire that tore through the country’s historic parliament complex can be conjured as yet another example of the state, by neglect, or design, did not provide security, rendering the national assembly homeless, reduced to a squatter in the City of Cape Town, town hall. 

Beyond well known cases of corruption and state capture, it is necessary to be reminded of the emergence of criminal syndicates. In the latter case the South African construction and mining industries have become targets of extortion, intimidation, and violence. For example, in June 2021, Rio Tinto had to declare force majeure at its Richards Bay minerals operation due to violence, targeted attacks on its staff and management. By late 2022 Rio Tinto lifted this declaration, however, with significant negative impact on the operations, and communities that depend on the Rio Tinto operation for a livelihood. Additional manifestations of crime such as kidnappings, with the goal of extorting money from families for ransom, have also escalated in the course of recent years. 

If the state hoards the means of violence, in order to deliver a condition of civic peace for the normal operations of society and the economy to proceed, then clearly the South African state has been failing to live up to its part of the social contract. Continuing down this path will lead to a further loss of legitimacy, and trust in the state and its institutions. The latter factor will impact on any government to emerge after the 2024 national elections, whether it takes the form of a coalition, or not. 

V – State failure – the case of July 2021 insurrectionist inspired looting

One of the most glaring examples of the incapacity of the South African state to deliver security can be found in the tense nine days in July 2021, when Kwazulu-Natal, and Gauteng provinces, fell victim to rampant mass looting, violence. The latter, sparked by the imprisonment of former President Zuma. In this period it can be argued that failure of the state security apparatus to predict, isolate, neutralise, and curtail insurrectionist inspired acts of criminal looting, coincide as temporary state- and security system failure, in affected areas. Of course, it cannot be argued that there was total state failure, or national-level collapse at play. But rather a case of geographically confined, time-specific zones, where the state was totally absent, or where it failed dismally in its duty to secure and protect. 

In this peculiar case it can be argued that state failure can be a temporal phenomenon! A country that has already been rocked by revelations through the Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, and numerous other investigations- and revelations of corruption, therefore got confronted with a direct and significant security challenge, which, in turn,  exposed the ostensibly factionalised and fractious state security apparatus that has been turned into a tool wielded by politicians. 

In an interregnum of nine days, Kwazulu-Natal and Gauteng witnessed how the state was totally absent, leaving room for insurrectionist inspired looters to strike at the soft economic underbelly of malls, warehouses, pharmacies. The proverbial thin blue line of the state was coercively absent. Civic militias drawn from communities, neighbourhoods, and civil society organisations armed themselves to step into the breech left by the coercively absent state. 

South African media, and government, celebrated communities for coming out to protect malls and neighbourhoods. However, a deeper danger in these phenomena pertain to militia formation, where non-state actors arm themselves to provide security.

While media and even political leaders indicated that communities protecting themselves are commendable actions, it should be noted that, if in the long term the state security apparatus remains deficient, and incapable of protecting the citizenry at times when the state authority is being challenged, then serious red lights have to start flashing on the dashboard of those steering the ship of state. 

In July 2021 the state thus fomented violence, through its very absence, by retreating, and opening ground for these two forces (civic militias, versus, insurrectionists and criminal acts of mass looting) to meet on the streets of towns, townships, and cities. If interpreted strictly according to the concept of the state Thomas Hobbes deploys, it can be argued South Africans in the affected geographic areas, experienced a foretaste of state failure. 

When assessing the progress made during thirty years of democracy, it can be noted that while some progress has been made, it is evident that the erosion of state capability to guarantee collective security, is one of the greatest risks the democratic experiment in this country is facing as we head to the polls this year, for what promises to be a hotly contested, and hopefully not controversial, election. The major task at hand for any incoming government is to rein in forces that undermine state capability. If these are not curtailed, there is a real risk of state failure spreading further, like a silent killer, in the system. 

In conclusion. The state, by providing collective security remains a source of peace and prosperity. It is a well-known fact that a state that provides collective security, and hence stability, also stimulates economic and social development. Nevertheless, whether South Africa emerges with a single party forming a government this year, or with a coalition, there is a critical need, across the political divide, to reinforce the capacity of the state to enable social and economic development. 

Lastly, if the country does end up with a national coalition, the capability of the state should ideally not be further compromised. As we have seen in coalition experiments in the country’s major metros in the past few years, where contested coalitions only managed to compromise and undermine metro governments’ institutional capability to deliver services to citizens.